New York Times columnist Paul Krugman had an interesting column yesterday about how we might be forced to adjust to higher gasoline prices. For those of us who live in older, densely populated urban areas that have a mixture of housing, retail business, public transportation, and recreational areas all within walking distance, it's interesting to find that a neighborhood designed over a hundred years ago might be better adapted to meet the challenges of the coming years than the sprawling exurbs burgeoning up until quite recently.
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
It's So Old It's New
New York Times columnist Paul Krugman had an interesting column yesterday about how we might be forced to adjust to higher gasoline prices. For those of us who live in older, densely populated urban areas that have a mixture of housing, retail business, public transportation, and recreational areas all within walking distance, it's interesting to find that a neighborhood designed over a hundred years ago might be better adapted to meet the challenges of the coming years than the sprawling exurbs burgeoning up until quite recently.
Labels:
New York Times,
Oil Crisis,
Paul Krugman,
Urban Development
Monday, May 19, 2008
Who's Gonna Help Brother Get Further
It's been a while since I've posted to this blog! I'd like to finish my thoughts on Enlightenment Contested soon. In the meantime, here's a video I've been enjoying lately: Elvis Costello and Allen Toussaint singing Toussaint's song Who's Gonna Help Brother Get Further. Enjoy!
Monday, February 25, 2008
Enlightenment Contested, Part II -- Contra MacIntyre
![](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvn08h5nfoVHDVtMntDCYg-MUq7YD5fhNkgsK6lccavHsbdIgEG87GuQjHCZeDr9JSqoYiwOnnRGsGaeQCtAU44M581kklelRdRexrvQJg5tZrX0UjUoMCx8m_OX7cozpUMegOh2LlPSap/s320/Image+Enlightenment+Contested.jpg)
Academic critics of the Enlightenment in recent years can generally be divided into a left camp, which has built off of the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, and a right camp, which has drawn on the work of Aristotle. The left camp has worked under such labels as deconstruction, postmodernism, and poststructuralism, while members the right camp have been known as communitarians or neo-aristotelians. There is no particular logic to this division -- Nietzsche was no man of the left, and Aristotle of course predates any such political distinctions. My own guess is that Nietzsche's anti-Christian pronouncements may give him a kind of a leftist veneer, whereas the long connection between Aristotle and the Catholic Church might make him appealing to conservatives.
MacIntyre appears to have begun his career as something of a leftist. His first book, published in 1953, attempts to draw comparisons between Christianity and Marxism. However, by the time he wrote After Virtue, MacIntyre had become something of a Road Warrior-style dystopian. I know this sounds dramatic, but a passage from the end of his book should confirm my characterization:
If my account of our moral condition is correct, we ought also to conclude that for some time now we too have reached that turning point. What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the borders; they have already been governing us for some time.Of course, MacIntyre was not alone in 1981 thinking about apocalypse. I remember watching a Saturday-morning television program in the late 70's, Ark II, which featured a group of scientists, along with their pet monkey, traveling in a souped-up motorhome through apocalyptic landscape, bringing the light of science to those they met. But bringing enlightenment and scientific understanding to a benighted world is not what MacIntyre has in mind to do in After Virtue. The key word in the above quotation is "local forms of community." There is something appealing about this image, in an odd sort of way. Less like Ark II and more like the clan in Road Warrior, who huddle together in their refinery/fortress and use flame throwers to defend against marauders, we must grab at ideas that will help us to support each other in small communities as the world crumbles around us. Well, perhaps I exaggerate when I call this vision appealing. Romantic, perhaps.
But I'm getting a bit ahead of myself here. What does MacIntyre mean when he talks about local forms of community, and why is this his answer to the collapse of civilization as we know it? This is where we get into MacIntyre's critique of the Enlightenment. MacIntyre rejects entirely any notion of ideas that are universally applicable. While an idea may be shown to be true or false within the context of its own tradition, there is no there is no way to adjudicate between the truth claims of rival traditions. MacIntyre reaches for local forms of community not because it's in some way better than a universal conception of human society, but because it's the only game in town.
While he strongly implies that this is true for the natural sciences (take, for example, when he speaks of Newton's laws of physics, which, according to MacIntyre, merely "purport to be universal in scope"), MacIntyre's real focus in this book is on those ideas which govern human action. For Enlightenment thinkers, pre-emininent among such ideas was that of human equality. Not surprisingly, then, MacIntyre spends a great deal of time attacking the notion that humans can be be discussed in any general way without specifying the specific circumstances of the persons under discussion. Paraphrasing Aristotle approvingly, MacIntyre notes that "to be a man is to fill a set of roles each of which has its own point and purpose: member of a family, citizen, soldier, philosopher, servant of God. It is only when man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept." In other words, it simply makes no sense to talk about a human without reference to the roles he or she inhabits. A person is not a human being but a worker, minority, a woman, a criminal, a plutocrat, and so on.
So getting back to the Enlightenment again, where does that leave some of its central ideas? Most of us in the United States were schooled in Enlightenment ideas when we learned about the Declaration of Independence. In case your memory is a bit rusty, here's an episode of School House Rock to remind you. Thomas Jefferson and company argued concisely, beginning with the "self-evident" truth of human equality, and then famously asserting several rights, including those of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," that flow from that first truth. MacIntyre is just as swift in his dismissal of these ideas. He begins by noting somewhat wryly that the idea of general human rights did not find expression before 1400, but then he cuts to the chase:
From this it does not of course follow that there are no natural or human rights; it only follows that no one could have known that there were.And this at least raises certain questions. But we do not need to be distracted into answering them, for the truth is plain: there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.It doesn't take much in the way of subtle analysis to see something disturbing in MacIntyre's argument. His reference to witches and unicorns is nothing more than a cheap rhetorical ploy, in which a bully tries to foist the failings of his own position onto his opponent. The systematic attack on magical beliefs was unquestionably one of the central (and well-documented) tasks of Enlightenment thinkers, but here MacIntyre attempts to clothe himself in the dress of those victorious thinkers even as he attacks their central ideas. But back to his argument; a paragraph later he lets the other shoe drop. He argues that there is no basis to assert these rights because "we know that there are no self-evident truths."
This exposition has taken longer than I thought it would, and I haven't even gotten back to Israel's critique! I plan on continuing with a follow-up post soon.
Monday, January 7, 2008
Enlightenment Contested
For the New Year I've begun reading historian Jonathan Israel's latest book, Enlightenment Contested. The work is a follow-up to his earlier study, Radical Enlightenment, which I read a few years ago. I'm quite excited to work through this book. Israel has grand intentions here; he plans on writing, in three volumes (of which this is the first), a comprehensive interpretation of the Enlightenment, the first since Peter Gay's The Enlightenment, written in 1966.
Building on his work in Radical Enlightenment, Israel argues that there were in fact two Enlightenments, a Moderate Enlightenment and a Radical Enlightenment. The former was championed by names that have been most commonly associated with the Enlightenment: Locke, Voltaire, Newton, Leibniz. Israel argues that this moderate Enlightenment was in continuous conflict with the more underground and suppressed but ultimately more coherent and significant Radical Enlightenment, whose leading light was the Dutch Philosopher Baruch Spinoza. Early on Israel notes the difference between these two movements:
The philosophes labelled in this work 'radical' were those who, prior to 1752--marking the end date of this present volume--openly opposed not just tyranny, intolerance, credulity, superstition, and ecclesiastical sway, like all men of the Enlightenment, but also the moderate mainstream Enlightenment of Locke, Newton, and Voltaire, rebelling so to speak from the 'left.' That is they broadly denied all miracles and revelations and rejected physico-theology, Lockean empiricism, and providential Deism along with monarchy, (in most cases) aristocracy, and all social, racial, and sexual hierarchy.(43)One thing that distinguishes Israel's newest work from Radical Enlightenment is his willingness to outline the contemporary significance of his scholarship and to engage in polemics against his opponents, those scholars who belittle the achievements and enduring significance of the Enlightenment. Here I quote from the preface:
does it really matter how we interpret the Enlightenment? Surely, it does. For while it have been fashionable in recent years, above all (but not only) in the Postmodernist camp, to disdain the Enlightenment as biased, facile, self-deluded, over-optimistic, Eurocentric, imperialistic, and ultimately destructive, there are sound, even rather urgent, reasons for rejecting such notions as profoundly misconceived and insisting, on the contrary, that the Enlightenment has been and remains by far the most positive factor shaping contemporary reality and those strands of 'modernity' anyone wishing to live in accord with reason would want to support and contribute to.(v)I'm about 1/4 of the way through the book now. As with Radical Enlightenment, Israel has done his homework. He has plunged into the primary material and done exemplary work in placing texts in context, and discussing not just the works but how they were debated by various factions. Israel has set out explicitly to write in a modern form of the "history of ideas" style rather than in what he would consider the voguish style of social historians. I'll report back later on the meat of his text.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)